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POLICY AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
A NEW SEMANTICS
OLIVER MORSE*

1883, it was decided in the Civil Rights Cases" that the limitations
of the fourteenth amendment were applicable to state action only.
Even before the Civil Rights Cases, in 1879, it was held that state action
included executive and judicial action as well as legislative action.'
Since that time the courts have been developing concepts of state
action to insure a liberal operation of the fourteenth amendment. 3 The
search has been for state action; for a link between the right allegedly
violated and some action by or on behalf of the state. Lately, policy
decisions have been handed down to avert escape from the limitations
imposed by the amendment. These decisions have either avoided (not
violated) the restriction of the fourteenth amendment to state action or
they have attenuated the fiction of state action. In the courts' declared
intention to interpret the fourteenth amendment liberally new symbols
and metaphors have been used or intimated to underwrite this policy.'
Perhaps an acquaintance with these new "meanings" of state action will
afford some insight as to how far the courts will go in support of a liberal
policy of construction.
Within the past year and a half, three decisions have been handed
down by the federal courts which are considered herein as policy de-

IN

Professor of Law, Southern University, School of Law.
1. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
3. See Note, The Disintegration of a Concept-State Action Under the 14th and 15th
Amendments, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 402 (1948).
4. "It is a fundamental canon of construction that a Constitution should receive a
liberal interpretation in favor of a citizen, especially with respect to those provisions which
were designed to safeguard the liberty and security of the citizen in regard to both person
and property.
" . . . In construing a Constitution it cannot be carried out with mathematical nicety
to logical extremes. Thus, the provisions of the Federal Constitution are not mathematical
formulas having their essence in form, but they are organic living institutions transplanted
from English soil. Their significance is vital, not formal, and is to 'be gathered by considering their origin and the line of their growth, not simply by taking the words and a
dictionary." 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law § 59 (1937) (footnote numbers omitted). See
this reference and the cases cited therein.
"The rule is firmly imbedded in American law that the guaranty of due process-whether
the Fifth Amendment, as a limitation upon the power of the federal government, or under
the Fourteenth Amendment, as a limitation upon the power of the states-is to be liberally
construed to effectuate its purpose of protecting the citizen against arbitrary invasion of
his rights of life, liberty and property." Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. "459, 474, 169 P.2d 831,
843 (1946).
*
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cisions illustrating the trend toward liberal construction of the fourteenth
amendment. These decisions are found in the cases of Derrington v.
Plummer,' Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors6 and Brewer v. Hoxie
School DistrictNo. 46.' Most of the discussion herein will revolve around
these cases.
PUBLIC PURPOSES AND

GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

In Plummer v. Casey,' a suit was brought by Negroes against county
officials and the lessee and operator of a courthouse cafeteria for a judgment declaring the exclusion of Negroes from the cafeteria facilities as
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Also requested was a permanent injunction restraining all the defendants
from such exclusion. It was established that a new courthouse was
built with public funds derived from taxes and an authorized bond issue;
that in the basement thereof a kitchen and other cafeteria facilities were
installed; that the county never operated the cafeteria but leased it
to the defendant, Derrington, from the beginning and that Derrington
acquired the lease by bid. It was further established that the lease
granted sole and exclusive control of the leased premises to Derrington
to operate a cafeteria; that the cafeteria was patronized principally by
the courthouse employees, jurors and others having business in the
building; that it was always open to the general public as a cafeteria;
and that Derrington served only members of the white race. To the
claim that equal protection of the laws had been denied, the county
answered that under the state law it could sell or lease county property
not immediately needed for government purposes; that by reason of its
lease to Derrington it had divested itself of control of the premises and
the operation thereof; that its execution of the lease was done in a
private capacity; that the leased premises were not public or committed to
public use; and that Derrington as a private restaurateur could serve
whom he pleased. The defendant, Derrington, claimed that as a private
individual he was not within the coverage of the fourteenth amendment.
The federal district court held that the county having undertaken to
furnish eating facilities to citizens must do so for all citizens on an equal
basis. It further reasoned that the county's renewal of the lease with
knowledge both of the lack of equal facilities and of the pendency of
this action, coupled with no action on the part of the county to provide
appropriate facilities for the plaintiffs, entitled them to relief. Turning
to the defendant Derrington, the court stated:
5. 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957).
6. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
7. 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
8. 148 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Tex. 1955), aff'd sub nor. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d
922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957).
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[T]he operation of the cafeteria here is too close, in origin and purpose, to the

functions of the County government to allow the concessionaire the right to refuse
service without good cause. 9

The court therefore enjoined the county from denying the plaintiffs the
right to patronize the cafeteria, a right which the county had not itself
denied. The court also enjoined the county from renewing or extending
the lease "without specific assurances that facilities will be made available for the use of colored persons under circumstances and conditions
0
substantially equal to those afforded members of the white race."'
Derrington was also enjoined from continued exclusion of Negroes from
the facilities of the cafeteria.
At this point it should be noted that there exists a dichotomy in the
rationale defining the obligations of the county and of Derrington.
Here the very conduct of the county in leasing with the knowledge of
the unavailability of facilities to the plaintiffs, apart from the conduct
of Derrington in refusing to serve them, was considered unconstitutional.
The court's opinion indicates that the violation of the plaintiffs' rights
by the county did not derive from Derrington's conduct; that Derrington's conduct was but an incidence of that violation; and that Derrington's actions were not imputed to the county. Bearing witness to
this dichotomy is the fact that the court felt that the granting of relief
against Derrington presented "a more difficult question."" With respect
to Derrington, the court concerned itself with the constructive notice
that he had of the public purpose of the cafeteria facilities. In addition
to this the court felt that Derrington was engaged in an activity too
close in origin and purpose to a governmental function to allow his
conduct to continue.
Although the above analysis may sound like circumlocution, the result
thereof is important. It shows that a court was willing to fix a constitutional obligation without a technical allusion to the "private acts" that
violated the alleged constitutional right. Here the search for state action
was not sought by inference, nor did it derive from Derrington's acts
which were in essence the only acts of actual exclusion of the plaintiffs.
Here the obligation was fixed at the inception of the state activity, to
wit, the building and leasing of the cafeteria facilities with no appropriate
facilities for the plaintiffs.' 2 With the duty fixed at this point, the court,
9. Id. at 329. (Emphasis added.) Cf. Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545,
549 (E.D. Va. 1949), a case using the same language but with respect to the fifth amendment. See also note 20 infra.
10. 148 F. Supp. at 329.
11.. Ibid.
12. The Plummer v. Casey case lends itself quite easily to the fixing of a constitutional
obligation at the inception of state activity because it was decided on the basis of the
continued existence of the separate-but-equal doctrine. As a result, it was not difficult for
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in pursuance of policy, had logical basis for granting a decree of such
dimensions as it did. It must be borne in mind that the decree did not
merely enjoin Derrington from his discriminatory conduct. It went
further and enjoined the county from renewing or extending the present
lease or executing a new lease or otherwise divesting itself of control of
the premises "without specific assurances that facilities will be made
available for the use of colored persons." The practical effect of this decree is to write a provision in the lease for the county and forestall any
such inferential violation of the fourteenth amendment. The usual application of the fourteenth amendment would be negative and decree that
3
a lease could not be executed with a condition enforcing segregation.1
The logic of the Plummer case is positive in that it imposes on the
4
government a duty to make conditions in a lease avoiding segregation.1
This portrays the fourteenth amendment as positive rather than negative and indicates that under its aegis a state can be told what to do as
well as what not to do.
On appeal, the judgment in Plummer v. Casey was affirmed in Derrington v. Plummer.5 The court of appeals held that the premises in
question were established for a public purpose and as such could not
the court to find an initial constitutional obligation on the county to provide appropriate
facilities at the outset. For discussion in the text the Plummer case was selected for its
approach and form and not its content. Using the approach of the Plummer case, the
constitutional obligation can still be fixed at the inception of state activity in a situation
where the point of departure is not the separate-but-equal doctrine. This approach could
very well be used to meet the threat of some of the southern states to avoid integration by
turning over the state schools to private individuals or corporations. The very act of
doing so could be held illegal under the rationale of the Plummer case and state action
would not have to derive from the refusal on the part of these private individuals or corporations to integrate.
13. However, "there are, undoubtedly, instances of occasional leasings of property
owned by Federal, State or Municipal authorities, which are permitted even though admission is restricted. A lease of a public auditorium or other public facility to a bona fide
and lawful private organization or individual for limited hours or days, and for express
purposes, is legal although admission is limited to certain individuals or groups but, in
such cases, the same right to lease must rest in any and all groups seeking such a lease."
Tate v. Department of Conservation and Development, 133 F. Supp. 53, 61 (E.D. Va. 1955),
aff'd, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956).
14. See Tate v. Department of Conservation and Development, supra note 13, where
in order to avert future violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights by the leasing of
a state park, the court said: "Accordingly, the defendants are required to elect to operate
on a non-discriminatory basis, or, if leased, to see that the park is operated by the lessee
without discrimination." The Plummer case was decided on the basis that the separatebut-equal doctrine still obtained, so its exact holding would not be authority for insistence
in a lease that segregation be avoided. However, the rationale of the decision would
support the existence of an obligation to make such a condition in a lease. See also note
12 supra.
15. 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 1924 (1957).

1958]

A NEW SEMANTICS

be diverted to a purely private use.1 It further reasoned that if the
county could not refuse the plaintiffs service neither could Derrington,
hence Derrington's conduct was state action. Although the language
of this affirmance is not in all respects similar to that of the lower court,
two factors indicate that the court of appeals was in accord with the
policy followed in the lower court. One, the court of appeals, realizing
that the present lease with Derrington would expire before the appellate
mandate would take effect, recognized a moot aspect in the plaintiffs'
claims. Despite this it felt that the illegality of the practice should be
settled. Two, the injunctive decree of the lower court was affirmed without disturbance.
The term "public purpose," in constitutional law, is generally thought
to be one of the prerequisites for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. According to the Plummer cases, discussed above and the cases
cited therein, public purpose has assumed another connotation. 1 7 It would
seem that anything governmentally supplied, established or ordained
for the use, benefit or control of citizens generally has a public inception
and hence has a public purpose. In addition to this a public purpose
would seem to be a determinate of a governmental function. Activity
which directly carries into effect a public purpose would appear to be
the performance of a governmental function. A fortiori, the existence
of a public purpose presumes the existence of a governmental function.
Things which are private in nature can also be the proper subject matter
of a public purpose. As was stated in St. Petersburg v. Alsup:
may ever engage in purely private action that
It is doubtful whether a municipality
8
would not be action of the state.'
16. "[T~he courthouse had just been completed, built with public funds for the
use of the citizens generally, and this part of the basement had been planned, equipped
and furnished by the County for use as a cafeteria. Without more justification than is

shown in this case, no court could contenance the diversion of such property to a purely
private use." 240 F.2d at 925.
17. Other facilities held to have had a public inception (and hence a public purpose)
include: public schools, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); golf courses: Beal
v. Holcome, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951); Holmes v. Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.
1955); Sweeney v. Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525 (W.i. Ky. 1951); swimming pools: Kansas
City v. Williams, 205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1953); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004
(S.D. W. Va. 1948); Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948);
public parks, Tate v. Department of Conservation and Development, 133 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.
Va. 1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956); and beaches:
Dawson v. Mayor, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955); St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830

(5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 922 (1957).
18. 238 F.2d 830, 832 (5th Cir. 1956). Following this statement, the court footnoted,
as an exception, a municipality acting in a fiduciary capacity' and cited, as its authority,
In re Girard's Estate, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956). This exception has since been
obviated. See the text at note 21 infra.
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Although a governmental function derives from a public purpose the
new meaning attached to governmental function does not seem to be
restricted by a public purpose. State action is no longer restricted to the
performance or exercise of a governmental function.1 9 Now activities
which are close in origin and purpose to a governmental function
symbolize state action.2" If the origin and purpose of a governmental
function are to be found in a public purpose then activities "close to"
a public purpose are not therein confined. So it is that activities affecting
and effecting a public purpose could well be analogized as the performance of a governmental function and thus state action. This is not
unhappy logic. It has the credence of inference residing in the Girard
and Hoxie cases later discussed herein.
GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY AND GOVERNMENTAL CHARACTER

The discussion in the preceding section embraced those instances
where the right allegedly denied had its inception in a public act by a
public body or agency. In this section the discussion will deal with those
instances in which the right had its inception in a private act by a private
individual.
In the case of In re Girard's Estate,2 Girard, a private individual,
devised and bequeathed his entire residuary estate to "The Mayor,
Aldermen and Citizens of Philadelphia," their successors and assigns,
in trust to establish and maintain a college for "poor male white orphan
19.

Perhaps the first important departure from the idea that action by an organization

"unfettered by statutory control" could only be private action was expressed in Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), where it was held that, even though subject to no state

regulation in setting up the qualifications for voting in primaries, a private political
organization in so doing was performing a state function because there were in existence

numerous state statutes regulating the primary process.
In Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.S.C. 1947), aff'd, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947),

the court went further and declared that, even in the absence of state regulation of the
primary process, a private political organization, in defining the qualifications for voting
in primaries, was performing a state function.

Both of these cases reason in terms of a

direct performance of a state function. The Plummer case goes further and speaks of the
performance of acts which are close in origin and purpose to a governmental function.
Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
20. See Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545, 549 (E.D. Va. 1949), where the

court said: "We do not hold that Air Terminal was an air carrier, or engaged in air
transportation; we do hold its restaurants are too close, in origin and purpose, to the
functions of the public government to allow them the right to refuse service without good
cause." See note 9 supra.
21. 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956), rev'd sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors,
353 U.S. 230 (1957). Cf. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945),

where a private individual donated to a city a library building and a fund to maintain the
library and erect and maintain four library branches if the city would create a perpetual
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children." A year after the death of Girard, the Pennsylvania Legislature enabled the city of Philadelphia to enact such ordinances and do
such acts as were necessary to execute the will's provisions. Thirty-nine
years later, legislation was passed providing a Board of Directors of
City Trusts to administer all trusts confided to the city. According to
the act such Board was to be "dissociated from the general government
of the city." The Board consisted of fifteen persons, including the Mayor,
Presidents of the Councils and twelve other citizens appointed by certain
judges. The City Treasurer served as treasurer of the Board. In 1954,
two Negro orphans applied for admission to the college and were refused
by the Board because it felt it had no power, under Girard's will, to
admit other than white boys. Following this, the rejected applicants,
the City of Philadelphia, through its mayor, and others, filed separate
petitions in the Orphans Court for a citation upon the Board to show
cause why the applicants should not have been admitted. The Board
admitted that the applicants were refused admission solely on the basis
of their race. The petitioners contended that this was in violation of the
fourteenth amendment; that the trust for the college was a public trust
and involved state action. The Orphans Court upheld the action of the
Board and this decision was appealedto the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which affirmed the holding of the Orphans Court. After discussing
the fundamental right of an individual to dispose of his own property according to his conscience, the state supreme court then wrestled with
the question as to whether the action of the Board, in administering the
trust, was state action to come within the purview of the fourteenth
amendment. It reasoned that the Board was merely the title holder of
Girard's property and not the beneficial owner; that as a trustee it could
only act in a fiduciary capacity like any other private individual or trust
company acting as a trustee. The court felt that if the Board were
engaged in state action, it could have legislated and changed the terms
of the will, which it actually could not have done. The court then stated
as facts that the college controlled its own policies and management;
that its employees were employees of the college and not those of the
city; that the college was erected on land owned by Girard and built with
Girard's funds; that it was supported and maintained for over a hundred
years by Girard's estate and not by taxpayers' money; and that the Board
had to account, not to the city, but to the Orphans Court for its acts as
trustee as did any other trustee. The court interpreted the charter of
the city as excluding the Board from the general government of the city.
annuity therefor to be paid to a board of trustees selected by the donor; such board was
to be incorporated and have the power to manage the library, and the duty to make annual
reports to the city of the library's proceedings, condition, receipts and disbursements: held,
the board's action was state action.
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In view of all of this, the court concluded that the action of the Board
was private action exercised as a private trustee under a private trust. In
addition to this, it was also concluded that even if the Board were thought
to be engaging in state action, the petitioners were not entitled to the
remedy they sought because if the fourteenth amendment prohibited the
Board from carrying out the will of Girard, the will should not suffer
change but rather a new trustee should be substituted. Finally, the court
speculated that the reason Girard appointed the city as trustee was to
insure the selection of a perpetual and responsible one.
22 the United States
On appeal, in Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors,
Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the judgment of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Court in unequivocal language held
that the Board was an agency of the State of Pennsylvania and its
refusal to admit the Negro applicants was violative of the fourteenth
amendment. This is all that was said. Following this, the Court cited
Brown v. Board of Educ.2 3 What is being suggested here is the adherence
to a policy.
Inasmuch as the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the
Girard case is a per curiam opinion, some credence can be given to the
dissenting opinion in the In re Girard's Estate case. Such a license is
being exercised herein because this dissent at least displays quite supportable rationale for its conclusions. Also, this dissent is probably one
of the more comprehensive dissents written. It is longer than the
majority opinion and addresses itself to practically all the premises of
or positions taken by the majority. It seems to display a mastery of
the use of reductio ad absurdum and a fortiori logic, the latter essential
to the maintenance of policy. It is also quite literary and well merits
the time spent in reading and understanding it.
At the outset, the dissent pointed out that Girard's will would have
been but a "dream" without state action. To secure this position it was
revealed that from 1831 to 1953, five legislative acts were passed to give
legal effect to the provisions of Girard's will, and that between 1832
and 1869, forty-eight ordinances were enacted by the City Council
"devoted exclusively to Girard College." In addition to this a special
committee of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives was appointed
to superintend the Girard estate.2 4 The dissent pointed out that the
Girard estate did not have to pay commissions on income and capital
gains which were required of private trustees. It was reasoned that a
Board dissociated or excluded from the general government was not one
dissociated or excluded from sovereign authority and hence the Board
22.
23.
of the
24.

353 U.S. 230 (1957).
347 U.S. 483 (1954). This case held that segregation in public schools was violative
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See In re Girard's Estate, 386 Pa. 548, 620-26, 127 A.2d 287, 321-23 (1956).
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was in fact a department'of the municipality. Carrying this further it
was submitted that a municipal corporation could only be trustees where
the grant involved a public purpose, hence Girard's trust was not a
private trust. The dissent could not imagine how the city could be the
agent of a private individual since public. officials have but one master,
the public. Neither could the dissent imagine how the city could act as
a fiduciary since it had not a fiduciary existence but only a municipal
existence. Coupled with the inability of the city or its departments to
act in a private capacity, the dissent felt that the "plethora" of governmental activity displayed made the actions of the Board those of the
state. 5
It is obvious from the rationale of this dissent and the "it goes without
saying" attitude of the United States Supreme Court, that anything
having a private inception may assume a governmental character if substantial governmental activity is involved in underwriting the success of
that private endeavour. So it would seem that a new symbol for state
action could be governmental character which would be determined by
the amount of governmental activity involved. Governmental activity
would appear to be legislation, enactments, ordinances, public superintendence, public assistance or the use of public facilities, all or some of
which are used to facilitate the purposes of a private undertaking. The
dissent in the Girard case speaks of a "plethora" of governmental activity. Just what constitutes a "plethora" will have to depend on how
far the courts are willing to extend the policy of liberal construction of
the fourteenth amendment. There can be no fixed yardstick.
In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,2 the court rejected the theory
that the municipality in passing statutes granting tax exemptions and
governmental assistance by eminent domain to a private housing project
imbued the project with a governmental character as to make it violative
of the fourteenth amendment because of its racial discrimination in
rentals. It is submitted herein that, policy-wise, such a situation could
very well be considered today as sufficient and substantial governmental
activity to give such a project a governmental character 7 Now since it
25. "[I]n effectuating the objectives of his will, Stephen Girard called on the Legislature of Pennsylvania, the City Council of Philadelphia, the Mayor of Philadelphia, and
the Treasurer of Philadelphia. Then the General Assembly of the Commonwealth added
for his benefit the services of the judges of the Courts of Common Pleas (now 21) in
appointing the Board of City Trusts administering his estate. If such a plethora of governmental activity does not make Girard's trust a public trust, then the word 'public' has
undergone a mysterious transformation which is not recorded in the dictionaries of the
English language or the lexicon of the law." 386 Pa. at 630-31, 127 A.2d at 326.
26. 190 Misc. 187, 74 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
27. Compare this reasoning with the rationale of Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169
P.2d 831 (1946), discussed in the text at note 28 infra. See also Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R.,
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seems that the courts have begun to think in terms of governmental
activity another idea presents itself. If the governmental activity is not
sufficient to support the idea of a governmental character could not the
governmental activity itself be limited by the fourteenth amendment?
Quaere: Could not a tax exemption to a private enterprize whose acts
transcend the limitations of the fourteenth amendment be stricken as
participation in that violation? There is no doubt that the exemption
itself is state action.
STATUTORY STATUS

Closely related to the policy of finding state action in the existence of
a governmental character are those instances where the private agency
is found to have a statutory status. The case of Betts v. Easley' s is
illustrative of this. It espouses the proposition that a union, given the
capacity to act as a craft's sole bargaining agent under the Railway
Labor Act, has such a governmental character as to be restricted by
the fifth amendment of the Constitution. The same rationale could be
applied to an analogous situation involving state legislation. However,
the analogy should limit itself to legislation endorsing a public policy
and/or purpose such as a private corporation supplying a public utility.
That the Betts case is a policy decision there can be no doubt. It is
interesting to note that out of the fourteen head notes to this case only
one is captioned "Constitutional Law," and that note merely recites that
the constitution is to be liberally construed. The Betts case should be
limited to its facts and like situations. On the other hand, the rationale
of the Betts case, in pursuance of policy, might well imply the existence
of state action, in a private institution or agency, as action under governmental authority solely by reason of that institution's or agency's statutory status. Portentous though it be, the future may find state action
residing in the activities of a purely private corporation, performing
private functions, because of its statutory status, to wit, that its existence
and authority to act was governmentally authorized by statute.
323 U.S. 192 (1944), where it was held, that since Congress could not discriminate by an
act giving a union the capacity to act as a craft's sole bargaining agent, a union acting
under the aegis of that act could not discriminate because it was bound by the limitations
that inhered in the act.
28.

161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).

See also Central of Georgia Ry. v. Jones, 229

F.2d 648, 650 (5th Cir. 1956), where in an action for injunctive and other relief against the
enforcement of contract provisions, in an agreement between an employer and a union,
which prohibited the plaintiffs from being employed in certain jobs, the effect of the
Betts case was extended to require the employer to pay damages "and affirmatively afford
equal opportunity for actual employment in each of these jobs for the future."
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GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND QUASI-PUBLIC ACTION

The most intriguing and expansive of policy in the trilogy of cases
discussed herein is the Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46 decision. 9
It involved an action by a consolidated school district, its directors and
superintendent against certain private individuals for a declaratory judgment and an injunction against interference by the defendants with the
operation of schools, within the plaintiffs' jurisdiction, on a desegregated
basis. Following the decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., ° the
school board decided to desegregate schools within its jurisdiction, feeling that the Brown case invalidated all state laws requiring segregation.
It was the thinking of the Board that article VI, clause 3 of the United
States Constitution, requiring state officers to bind themselves by oath
to the Constitution, imposed upon it the right and duty to desegregate
without awaiting legislative compliance with the Brown case. In view
of this the schools were opened without segregation. After a while, the
defendants carried on systematic attempts to obstruct and prevent such
integration. As a result of this, the school district brought this action
and alleged that the defendants entered into and carried on a conspiracy
to prevent the school board "from securing equal protection of the laws
in the operation of the public schools to all persons within the district."'"
The acts by or on behalf of the defendants, private individuals, alleged
as violative of equal protection included: trespassing upon school property; annoying, threatening and intimidating the plaintiffs; making inflammatory speeches inciting physical violence and imploring mass action
to resist integration; threatening boycotts of the schools; threatening
to subject the plaintiffs to endless and expensive litigation; and attempting by fear to stop the children from attending school. It was further
alleged that these acts caused a reduction in school attendance and the
discontinuance of a school session. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs contended that article VI, clause 3 coupled with the fourteenth
amendment gave them the right to bring this action; that they had a
constitutional duty to support and obey the fourteenth amendment.
Among other things, the defendants contended that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action. In granting the plaintiffs the injunctive relief
they sought, the court stated:
The plaintiffs being bound .by constitutionally imposed duty and their oaths of
office to support the Fourteenth Amendment and to accord equal protection of the
laws to all persons in their operation of the Hoxie schools must be deemed to have a
right, which is a federal right, to be free from direct interference in the performance
32

of that duty.
29.
30.
31.
32.

238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
See note 23 supra.
238 F.2d 91, 93 (8th Cir. 1956).
Id. at 98, 99. (Emphasis added.)
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The court went on to reason that the right to be free from a deliberate and
direct interference with the performance of what it considered a constitutionally imposed duty arose by implication in that within a duty exists
a correlative right to be free from interference in performing that duty.
In true policy language, fortified with a fortiori reasoning, the court said:
In many cases the implied rights which have been upheld by the courts have been
against being interfered with in obeying the
of far less importance than the right
33
Constitution which is here involved.

Recognizing that this case essentially involved an enforcement of the
fourteenth amendment limitations, the court made some dialectic overtures to the existence of state action. It took the position that the defendants' conduct was "not in the nature of merely private conduct,"
and that if the defendants succeeded in coercing the school board to
rescind its desegregation order, such rescission could have been accomplished only through state action. Here is a hint of private action not
quite private but rather quasi-public.
It would seem that the languge in the Hoxie case could lend support to
the idea that state action is capable of being found in action which is
quasi-public. Further, quasi-public action would be that action by or
on behalf of private individuals, of a public nature, in a public setting,
effecting a public function, or private action which will affect or result
in some state action.
The Hoxie case has many interesting facets. Its approach is novel in
many respects. The fourteenth amendment is of negative proportions;
it is couched in negative terms; it is an amendment of limitations and
restrictions. In the Hoxie case the amendment was given positive application. It was used primarily to support the actions of the school
board. The language of the case seems to indicate that its primary sights
were fixed upon applying the fourteenth amendment in support of the
plaintiffs' actions rather than in limiting the defendants' conduct, to wit,
the focal point of its application was in favor of the plaintiffs and not
against the defendants. Also, in supporting the plaintiffs' contention
that as a state agency it had a positive responsibility to desegregate,
the court recognized what seems to be a new aspect in fourteenth
amendment construction. Conventionally, a state's conformance to the
fourteenth amendment lies in its duty not to avert the limitations therein.
The state's duty has not been to internally activate the provisos of the
amendment. Although the amendment is supreme to state law, the state
has never had to make the limitations in the fourteenth amendment a
part of its law regulating its citizenry. However, the Hoxie case seems
to purport such a positive responsibility; it makes it the duty of the state
33.

Id. at 99.
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to see that the limitations of the fourteenth amendment are internally
enforced. Witness to this is the fact that the court did not define the
plaintiffs' action, in desegregating, as a right to be enforced but rather
as a duty; the term "right" was used only with respect to the availability
of the injunction to the plaintiffs. Mention should also be made of the
fact that the Board, a state agency, was acting in contravention to the
laws of its own ordination, a fact conventionally possible only where the
internal laws of its sovereign have been repealed, changed or struck
down as unconstitutional. This had not happened. Yet the Hoxie case
achieved that result by giving credence to the proposition that a positive
governmental responsibility existed which was bound to ignore the internal law of the plaintiffs' state and defer to the limitations of the
fourteenth amendment. So it is that, under the aegis of the Hoxie case,
it can be proposed that the fourteenth amendment compels state action
in addition to limiting it.
Assuming that the governmental responsibility concept herein imagined
in the Hoxie case does exist, the refusal on the part of state agencies
to enforce the limitations of the fourteenth amendment by itself could
be reasoned to be state action. In Shelly v. Kraemer, 4 and the subsequent restrictive covenant cases, it was felt that the enforcement by
the courts of private action violative of the fourteenth amendment limitations was state action. With governmental responsibility as a point of
departure, the refusal of the courts to enforce fourteenth amendment
limitations, abridged by private individuals, could be state action. In
other words, inaction by the state could be interpreted to be state action.
With governmental responsibility as a legal fixture, refusal would be the
same as denial. 5
Another interesting phase of the Hoxie case is that the injunction was
granted in spite of the claim that it violated the first amendment protections of freedom of speech and assembly. Quaere: Could this be fourteenth amendment sedition?
34. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The case of Shelley v. Kraemer involved a restrictive covenant
excluding persons of certain races from ownership or occupancy of real property. It held

that judicial enforcement of such a covenant was state action in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1993), involved an action at law brought
by a co-covenantor for damages for the breach of a racial restrictive covenant. The case
held that judicial enforcement of this action was likewise state action violative of the
fourteenth amendment. It was reasoned that if the courts awarded damages for such a
breach the result would be either a refusal to sell restricted property to members of a
restricted race or the imposition of a higher sale price on those restricted to offset the
damages which the seller may incur, thus denying those restricted the right to purchase,
own and enjoy property on the same terms as others. See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948), a case illustrating adherence to the policy established by Shelley v. Kraemer.
35. Compare Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under The Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 So. Calif. L. Rev. 208, 212, 213, 215 (1957).
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It is evident that the policy of liberal construction is being followed.
Brown v. Board of Educ. has set the policy for desegregation and
integration.3" The holdings, conclusions, logic, implications, meanings
and language of the cases discussed herein are "signposts on the road"
toward the disintegration of the strict and conventional interpretations
of the fourteenth amendment. Policy and interpretation have supplanted
application with respect to the fourteenth amendment. 7
36.
37.
strued
C.J.S.,

See note 23 supra.
"All law, even constitutional law, is not static, but progressive, and is to be conwith respect to sound economic conditions, and an enlightened public policy." 16
Constitutional Law § 17 (1956).

